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ABSTRACT
Impartial public administration is a key gatekeeper against corruptive 
practices and the necessary condition for the process of democratisa-
tion. Yet, in the case of North Macedonia, there is an ongoing challenge 
in addressing the problem of politicisation of public administration. On 
one hand, the ombudsman holds the normative position to safeguard 
citizens in front of state administration bodies, to act upon the impar-
tiality biases or other deviances of norms, and to annually report to the 
National Parliament. On the other hand, the parliament should be able to 
hold executives and institutions accountable for their actions and to act 
upon the ombudsman’s recommendations. However, there is a limited 
understanding of the role that these two institutions can play in an ef-
fective fight against corruption as part of the democratisation processes. 
The purpose of the article is to examine the institutional gaps where the 
opportunities for corruption and social traps are encouraged. Based on 
theoretical, empirical as well as comparative observations, within single 
case method analysis, this article aims to examine the compliance of the 
theoretical fingerprints with the actual practice and provide a different 
angle on the institutional opportunities for social traps, in the context of 
unconsolidated democracies. The findings show that there is a causality 
between the institutional ‘silent guardian’ of the citizens and the preva-
lence of corruption. It also encourages further discussion on the factors 
that undermine the positions of the ombudsman and the parliament to 
take active engagement in rooting out the corruption from societies.
1 This article is a revised version of the paper entitled ‘The institutional integrity systems and the 
fight	against	corruption:Why	the	parliamentary	oversight	matters?’,	presented	at	 the	NISPAcee	
Annual	Conference,	Prague	9-11	April	2019.	The	research	leading	to	these	results	stems	from	the	
PLATO	project	 (The	Post-Crisis	 Legitimacy	of	 the	European	Union),	which	has	 received	 funding	
from	the	European	Union’s	Framework	Programme	 for	Research	and	 Innovation	Horizon	2020	
under	the	Marie	Skłodowska-Curie	Grant	Agreement	No.	722581.	The	dissemination	of	results	re-
flects	only	the	author’s	view	and	that	the	Research	Executive	Agency	or	the	European	Commission	
is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
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1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate on the deterioration of the quality of democracy, 
notably present in the Central and Eastern Europe, commonly linked to the 
prevalence of corruption and the weak rule of law. (Guasti and Mansfeldova, 
2018, pp. 9-21). These practices are especially evident in the case of Mace-
donia2 as fragile democracy with ongoing threats of corruptive prevalence 
and lack of democratic sustainability. Moreover, a situation of state capture 
has been identified, following a political crisis during 2015, triggered by the 
wire-tapping scandal on high-level corruptive cases. (EU Progress Report, 
2016, p. 9). One of the exemplified forms of the common concerns related to 
the corruption prevalence, is the weak law enforcement and the lack of im-
partial public administration. On the one hand, an effective and merit-based 
public administration has been recognized as a core pillar of the quality of 
governance and the necessary factor for consolidating democratic societies. 
On the other, the politicization of the public administration or the citizens’ 
discrimination in public employment based on political grounds, shows to be 
an important feature behind weak anti-corruption strategies. Moreover, the 
lack of mutual trust between the citizens and other collective actors proved 
to inhibits the progress of law enforcement and rooting out corruption from 
political systems.
Nevertheless, relevant independent bodies, such as the Ombudsman with a 
mandate to monitor, detect, act and report on biases in public administration 
bodies or discrimination as experienced by the citizens, have remained un-
der-acknowledged in the institutional set-up for prevention and repression 
of corruption. Additionally, the role of the national parliaments has as well 
remained under-acknowledged in the exercise of horizontal accountability as 
an important feature in constraining the power of executives and reducing 
the opportunities for abuses of power. Although the national parliaments as 
political and democratic institutions hold normative power to exercise dem-
ocratic accountability and hold the Ombudsman accountable for their action, 
the relation between the Ombudsman and the parliament in addressing the 
corruptive practices and providing for consolidation of democracies, remains 
understudied. Hence, this paper aims to grasp the loci of the (frequent) de-
terioration of the democratization processes in the case of Macedonia and 
to zoom into the roles of the Macedonian Parliament, i.e. Assembly and the 
Ombudsman in addressing the deviations of norms related to	politicization	of	
the public administration, or discrimination in the public employment based on 
political ground. This approach follows the Rothstein’ theoretical arguments 
2 The constitutional name was changed to the Republic of North Macedonia. In the text is ref-
fered as Macedonia.
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on the use of the principle of impartiality in the exercise of the governmental 
power and draws perspectives from the institutional theories on the qual-
ity of governance, corruption and social trust linked to the key role of the 
impartial administration in the effective fight against corruption. (Rothstein, 
2005, p. 24). It also draws arguments on the democratic theoretical approach 
in conceptualizing legitimation as a process of actual justification in providing 
for the exercise of democratic accountability, as one of the key pillars of em-
bedded democracies (Wolfgang, 2004, 2019).
Following the analysis of the theoretical and empirical findings to be dis-
cussed in the next sections, this article suggests that both the parliament and 
the Ombudsman, in cooperation with other collective actors, can provide for 
a political system that is able to address the citizens’ problems and create a 
political culture of accountability. This is important because the arguments 
presented in this article further engage with the discussion on the deteriora-
tion of democratization processes in Central and Eastern Europe, and encour-
age discussion on the role of the national parliaments and other independent 
and regulatory bodies in the fight against corruption, under the EU integra-
tion process. It does not, however, allow for definite conclusions concerning 
the factors that have an impact of these institutions in the system of check 
and balances, nor the factors that affect the individual choices, due to the 
limitation of this article.
2 The concept of social traps
In order to examine possible factors behind, this study takes the position of 
examining the opportunities for corruptive behavior as an obstacle for reach-
ing control of corruption. In this regard, academics have argued that in the ab-
sence of public criteria, flow of information and transparency over the quality 
of procedures and regulations, corruptive behavior is ‘invited’ and initiated. 
For example, the political party leaders take the opportunities for non-dis-
tributive strategies over (influential) groups of people that can provide for 
winning elections and keeping their power in place as long it’s possible. Such 
deviations take forms of clientelism, nepotism or patronage, reflected usually 
in an unequal distribution of goods or resources through social welfare pro-
grams (pensions systems, job opportunities in the public sector and whatever 
necessary for “buying votes” (Stokes et. al, 2012, pp. 14-16). These corrupt 
practices undermine the protection and the implementation of the collective 
strategies and allow individuals to further capture the public resources for 
private or third-party interest.
Therefore, the control of corruption is recognized to be the indispensable 
final stage of a successful process of democratization (Mungiu-Pippidi and 
Johnston, 2017, 2014). Countries which can learn how to take control of 
corruption epitomize countries with effective rule of law systems that are 
capable of providing legality, protection of human rights and safeguard of 
the social interest. Effective law enforcement and the ability of societies to 
empower people to accept the generalized moral norms and engage in en-
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deavoring a political culture of resilience against corrupt practices is a neces-
sary criteria for anti-corruption strategies to be considered successful. This 
would also amount as an indicator of exercising democratic accountability in 
practice and meeting the standard of representative democracies. The moral 
costs indeed have been identified as „expression of internalized beliefs attrib-
uting positive value to the respect of laws, and has been conceptualized as an 
informal institutional structure of compliance with legal norms regulating the 
conduct of public and private agents“ (Della Porta and Vannucci, 2005, p. 2). 
In this regard, the anti-corruption laws are said to be enforced by high moral 
costs exercised as informal sanctioning mechanisms based on cultural codes 
and values and the actors‘belief in the functionality of the system: that sanc-
tions and legal prosecutions can sustain and guarantee the rule of law and 
the principle of legality and predictability. Consequently, the respect of the 
formal institutions and the rules of the games provide for creating a political 
culture of account giving that can resist deviations of norms in all spheres 
of the society and enable empowerment and engagement of the citizens in 
maintaining the culture of high moral standards. When actors or elites in the 
allocation of rights and duties violate procedures, benefits and obligations, 
and the laws and procedures are manipulated, for unduly influence on the 
rules of the game, citizens are entrapped in the vicious cycle of corruption, 
the law enforcement is ineffective and the legitimacy of the state activities is 
jeopardized (Kaufmann, 2008; Rothstein, 2011; Kurer, 2005, p. 231).
Moreover, in line with Olsen and Rothstein’ arguments, these concepts are 
not considered as inherited or culturally determinate properties. As such, they 
are exposed to change, based on the interactions between the institutions, 
the public servants and the individuals (citizens). (Olsen, 2010, p. 159; Roth-
stein, 2005, p. 129). Consequently, the joint and mutually inter-dependent co-
operation can produce or destroy the mutual, i.e. social trust that can reduce 
or provoke the transition into a social trap. Social trap, on the other hand, is 
defined as ‘situation where individuals, groups or organizations are unable 
to cooperate owing to mutual distrust and lack of social capital, even where 
cooperation would benefit all’ (Rothstein, 2005, pp. 1-22). The common situ-
ation of social trap is exemplified, but not limited, by frequent anchors of the 
citizens’ mistrust in the administrative and democratic institutions, in form 
of weak law enforcement, disengagement from cooperation with others, or 
with the society in general. Hence, social trust, as argued by the institutional 
theorists, can also affect the interpretations and consequently, the political 
culture of accountability.
2.1 The principle of impartiality in representative democracies
The quality of impartial and professional public service affects the everyday 
life of the citizens. First, the administrative decisions provide for quality admin-
istrative services under which every person should be treated on fair and equal 
terms, and it’s not discriminated in exercising its rights in contact with the ad-
ministrative bodies. Second, transparent and open administrative decisions 
provide opportunities and equal access to merit-based job positions that are 
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not pre-determinate by political affiliation. Scholars have argued that “if a pub-
lic authority has a reputation for making the right decisions in the first place, 
this will generate public trust in the government and reinforce the legitimacy 
of administrative decision-making” (K.J. de Graaf et al., 2007, pp. 1-10). Hence, 
‘the legal quality of administrative decision-making is therefore of primary im-
portance to the individual citizen and the public at large. It is an important el-
ement in the administration of justice by public authorities and it is important 
in upholding the credibility and sustainability of the government as a whole.’ 
(Ibid.) In this regards, impartial public administrations can act, both as a guard-
ian against deviations of norms, i.e. abuses of public power for public gains 
and against social traps. On a contrary, politicized public administration indi-
cates risks of social traps or citizens’ disengagement in the law enforcements 
‘as forms of everyday resistance to ineffective governance of state institutions 
and reactions to large-scale political corruption’ (Ledeneva, 2011, p. 12).
Independent and regulatory bodies such as the Ombudsman, but also State 
Audit, State Commission for Prevention of Corruption etc. have a mandate to 
gather and report on relevant data, of biases, deviations and administrative 
malpractices on national, local and municipal level in order to justify the ex-
ercise of its normative powers, drawn from the citizens. Citizens indeed have 
their legal right to express their experiences with shortcomings or malpractic-
es in administrative decisions, inability to access public information or threats 
to their civil rights. Most common public forum in representative democracies 
where or when the scrutiny process on the annual reports of these institutions 
is exercised, is the national parliament. In most of the political democratic sys-
tems the Ombudsman and the other independent bodies are appointed and 
held accountable by the national parliaments, based on semi or annual results.
When seeking to account of the quality of decision-making, democratic pro-
cesses and respect for procedures, democratic theory’ scholars have drawn 
on the concept of legitimation as relation between actors that comprise 
both attributes by the institutions and the moral agents and as a process 
of actual	justification through which political rules and procedures are legit-
imized (Kneip and Merkel, 2018, p. 6). This type of justification also stands 
as a mechanism for account giving and gives access to the exercise of power 
relationships, empowered by citizens.  When an actual form of legitimation 
and account-giving between these institutions is in place, the flow of infor-
mation contributes to the transparency of governmental activities, with a 
tendency to diminish the concentration of power. Such practices stand as a 
form of horizontal accountability, by which the relationships between actors, 
institutions and decision-makers become more visible, reducing the possibil-
ities for capturing institutions for private interest (Scott, 2014, pp. 472-487; 
Merkel, 2004). When effective, accountability processes have an integrative 
effect and are conducive to intellectual and moral self-development as well as 
self-government (Ibid.) As institutional scholas have also argued, „they ame-
liorate the moral qualities of individuals and society through the internation-
alization of a democratic and civil ethos, improve communication, learning, 
and epistemic quality; contribute to power-equalization and political equal-
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ity“ (Olsen, 2014). Consequently, the politics of accountability involve both 
the pursuit of accountability within the accountability regime and efforts to 
change established regimes (Waren, 2014).
2.2 Research question and research methodology
This article therefore asks how the process of account giving affects ineffec-
tive law enforcement in anti-corruption strategies. First, it takes the assump-
tion that the deviances in the employment practices in public administration 
bodies affect the citizens’ trust in the political system and the situations of so-
cial traps. Second, it takes the assumptions that the account giving between 
the Ombudsman as an independent body that reports on such deviances and 
the national parliament as an institution that represents the citizens’ inter-
ests, affects, the culture of political accountability and the process of democ-
ratization. To examine the possible causality, the article first explores the 
institutional framework of the Ombudsman and the Assembly (the national 
parliament) and the conditions of account giving. By taking qualitative within 
single case study approach, the first methodological step includes an over-
view of the normative mandates of both institutions as evident in legal and 
institutional documents: Law on the Ombudsman, the Law on the Assembly, 
the Constitution, the Rule of Procedures, etc.
Second, to unpack the conditions of account giving, a comprehensive over-
view of the Ombudsman annual reports for the period of 2001-2016 is ap-
plied, by using a systematic approach, focusing on the deviations in the em-
ployment, based on political grounds as reported by the citizens in the annual 
reports. A sample of 14 annual reports was studied. Then, two types of empir-
ical evidence were listed: pattern evidence based on the most common data as 
reported by the Ombudsman in the period from 2001 to 2016 and sequence 
evidence: showing the temporal evidence on two key events that have been 
identified as critical junctures, both for the Ombudsman and the national par-
liament, i.e. the Assembly. The first critical juncture is identified in 2003 when 
the Constitutional amendments have been introduced and the Ombudsman 
as an institution expanded its competences to address cases of discrimina-
tions and biases in the principle of impartiality, fairness or legality. The second 
critical juncture is identified in 2015 when the European Commission tasked 
a group of independent senior rule of law experts to prepare a report and 
concrete recommendations, which fed into the Commission’s “Urgent Re-
form Priorities”, in light of the revelations in the wiretaps scandal, in summer 
2015.3 The same senior rule of law experts prepared a second report, in 2017, 
assessing implementation of their previous recommendations and providing 
guidance to the new government. This was the time when European Commis-
sion have took different step in the case of an EU applicant state and was the 
time when the role of the regulatory and independent bodies, including the 
3 During the period under review, January 2015 to January 2017, Macedonia has been engulfed 
in a political crisis that began when the leader of the opposition released wiretapped material 
revealing widespread corruption and egregious abuse of power within the government. The 
report outlined a set of urgent reform priorities comprising the main points in the EU agenda 
for Macedonia. (BTI, Macedonia country report, 2018).
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one of the Ombudsman, has been acknowledged as key actor in meeting the 
shortcomings in the rule of law and the fight against corruption.
Scholars have identified that during critical junctures, the political deci-
sion-making, the initiatives for political mobilization and coalition formation, 
and the strategic interactions between key actors, are likely to be directly in-
fluenced by multiple and contradictory political pressures of varying strength, 
which, given the generalized uncertainty, are likely to be ambiguous and to 
change rapidly (Capoccia, 2015, pp. 147-179). Political actors, therefore, have 
substantial leeway to choose which pressures to yield to, and which instead 
to resist, in deciding their best course of action (Ibid.) The critical junctures 
are also important features for analyzing the actors’ actions that (might) have 
been taken and contributed for different institutional path development to-
wards a change of political regimes.
Hence, to complement the qualitatitative analysis, a comprehensive overview 
of the annual reports of the National Assembly for the period from 2001 to 
2016 is also applied, as well as analytical method approach of the available 
minutes of meetings or stenograpic notes for given period. The access to data 
to the minutes of meetings of the relevant working bodies or releavant Inque-
ry Committees concerning the process of legitimation or actual justification is 
inconsistent. The public disscussions that have taken place on regular plenary 
sessions are analysed, with some inconsistency in the dates/years of analysis. 
A sample of 26 documents was studied and comparative method of analy-
sis was applied. The analysis was focused on the disscusions on the discrim-
ination on political ground as indentified in the Ombudsman reports. Most 
of the documents were available in English, while some official documents 
were only available in Macedonian language, and therefore the findings have 
been translated in English language. To complement the scope of analysis, 
additional empirical evidences on corrupt administration practices related to 
discrimination in public employment based on political ground were drawn 
from OSCE/ODIHR elections monitoring reports, the EU Progress reports and 
other findings of international and national institutions, related to corrupt 
administrative practices, prior and after the period of the critical junctures.
In the dissussion section, the theoretical fingerprints drawn from the insti-
tutional and democratic theoretical approach, are analyzed from the per-
spective of the empirical findings. The methodological approach for this 
paper follows the tradition of ‘explanation through interpretation’ in the 
Weberian sense4 aiming to elaborate on the causalities between observed 
theoretical fingerprints and the actual empirical findings. The outcome seen 
as democratic deterioration and ineffective prevention of the opportunities 
for corruption is indicated in the secondary literature. Macedonia as an EU 
candidate country is a typical case of a fragile democracy. According to the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) published in 2018, Mace-
donia has reached limited transformation in the democratization process and 
4 Social science in this view ‘is a science concerning itself with the interpretative understanding 
of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences’ (Weber, 
1978, p. 4).
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is identified as defective democracy rather than consolidated democracy, 
reaching deterioration in the democratization process (BTI, 2018, p. 11). That 
said, an analysis is proceeds in the next section.
3 Results: the competences of the Ombudsman and the 
Assembly
3.1 The competences of the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman is an independent and self-governing body, regulated under 
the Constitution since 1991 (The Ombudsman Law, 2003, Article 3). The Om-
budsman protects the constitutional and legal rights of citizens when there 
have been violations by state administration bodies or other bodies and orga-
nizations with public mandates (Constitution, 1991, Article 77). The Macedo-
nian Parliament adopted the first Law on the Public Attorney (Ombudsman) 
in 1997. Relevant critical juncture for the development of Ombudsman in this 
period is the adoption of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001.5 Follow-
ing the constitutional amendments upon the Ohrid Framework Agreement, 
the Ombudsman Law was amended in 2003 by which the institution was de-
centralized and six regional offices were established (Official Gazette of RM, 
2003, No. 60).
According to the Constitution and the Ombudsman Law, the Ombudsman is 
accountable to the Macedonian Assembly by the mechanism of ex-ante and 
ex-post scrutiny. The Ombudsman is elected by the Assembly upon nomina-
tion, and is accountable to the Assembly, by reporting with annual report in 
a public session attended by representatives of the Government (The Om-
budsman Law, 2003, Article 5; 2009, Article 36). The annual report is a pub-
lic document and contains the Ombudsman’s findings regarding the level of 
respect for the human rights and freedoms of citizens, a description of the 
main problems, statistical data, information on processed and ongoing com-
plaints, a description of specific cases of violations, as well as a report of the 
other activities of the Ombudsman (Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, 
Article 56). Submitting its findings to the Assembly accounts for exercise of 
democratic horizontal accountability and the reports should be scrutinized 
in sessions with Government representatives (Assembly of the Republic of 
Macedonia, 2014, p. 209).
The Ombudsman may also submit special reports to bodies within local gov-
ernment. The Ombudsman is obliged to handle complaints conscientiously, 
impartially, efficiently and responsibly (The Ombudsman Law, 2003, 2009, Ar-
ticle 7). The Ombudsman’s office may initiate procedures at its own initiative 
if it assesses that the constitutional and legal rights of citizens are violated or 
if the principles of non-discrimination and equitable representation of com-
munity members in the bodies (The Ombudsman Law, 2003, 2009, Article 13).
5 This agreement was established, between political parties representing ethnic Macedonians 
and ethnic Albanians, after the inter-ethnic conflict which occurred the same year.
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3.2 The parliamentary oversight framework
The Assembly on the other hand, performs legislative, representative and 
oversight role. As a regulated system of parliamentary democracy, the pow-
ers of the executive, the legislature and judiciary are separated and the ex-
ecutives are accountable to the Assembly (Constitution of the Republic of 
Macedonia, 1992, Article 92; 2005, 2019).6
The oversight functions of the Assembly are regulated with the Constitution, 
the Law on Assembly and the Rules of Procedures of the Parliament and sev-
eral means are available for executing the normative power of holding ex-
ecutives accountable of their performances in the protection of the public 
interest. Important feature of the normative functions of the Assembly is the 
oversight over the actions of the Government administration: Parliament may 
ask for reports and information from those ministers and officials who are 
responsible for the work of administrative bodies, or on matters within the 
scope of the respective ministries’ competencies. More precisely, they can ask 
them to submit reports on enforcement and implementation of the law or 
other particulars at their disposal. The state administration bodies perform 
their duties autonomously and on the basis and within the framework of the 
Constitution and laws, being accountable for their work to government (Arti-
cle 96 of the Constitution).
An important means for this type of parliamentary scrutiny are: 1) Oversight 
(Committees) Hearings: the government’s accountability to the parliament is 
brought into play by holding hearings in committees. 2) Inquiry Committees 
set up for any domain or any matter of public interest (Article 76 of the Con-
stitution, Official Gazette, 2013). The Assembly can also set up a permanent 
committee of inquiry for the protection of the freedoms and rights of citizens. 
The findings of the committee form the basis for any initiation of proceedings 
to ascertain the answerability of public officials. The oversight hearings as a 
control mechanism in the case of Macedonia were introduced under the Law 
on the Assembly, in August 2009. Any relevant working body can initiative 
oversight hearing (RoL, Article 21: (1). The working body can decide to hold an 
oversight hearing with the majority of the votes from the present members 
and with at least one third from the total number of members (RoL, 2009, 
Article 22). Oversight hearings are held in order to obtain information and ex-
pert opinion about the creation and implementation of new policies, enforce-
ment of laws and other Governmental activities of the state administration 
bodies (IPU, 2016). During the oversight hearing, the respective working body 
can invite authorized representatives of Government or state administration 
bodies at the session and ask them to provide information and explanations 
regarding the subject of the oversight hearing. The working body can also ask 
the authorized representatives to submit the requested information, opin-
ions and positions in writing, at least three days before the session of the re-
spective body is held. During the oversight hearings, information is required, 
6 The Assembly is comprised of 123 MPs elected for four-year mandates by a proportional re-
presentation system.
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if necessary, to harmonize or clarify concrete issues and facts. Moreover, 
each parliamentary group is entitled to expert advice and a separate office, 
according to the number of Members of the Assembly in the group (Rules of 
procedures, Article 22 and 33). As regulated with Article 104 of the Rule of 
Procedures, minutes shall be kept from parliamentary sessions. After the end 
of the oversight hearing, the working body submits a report to the Assembly, 
which includes the essence of the presentations, and can propose conclusions 
to submit to the Government.
The Inquiry Committee, on the other hand, is a mechanism that ensures an 
ex-post control over the Government and other institutions that accountable 
to parliament, i.e. the Assembly. An inquiry committee is a body, which can 
be established by a decision of the Assembly to undertake the function of 
political control in all areas and all matters of public interest. Proposal for the 
establishment of an inquiry committee can be submitted by at least 20 MPs. 
An exception to this rule is the Committee for Protection of Civil Freedoms 
and Rights, which is a standing inquiry committee. Terms of reference and 
composition of inquiry committees are specified by the decision for establish-
ment, whereby presidents of inquiry committees by the rule are from among 
the MPs from the opposition parliamentary groups. Inquiry committees are 
formed to establish facts and situations related to controversial matters, 
which are under the competence of ministries and other state authorities. An 
inquiry committee has a task to inspect the documentation, make an analysis 
of each separate event or case and present the findings in front of the Assem-
bly. Inquiry committees cannot have investigative and other judicial functions. 
However, the findings of the inquiry committees may be the base to initiate 
a procedure to call to account the holders of public office (Rules and Proce-
dures of the Assembly of RM, 2008, 2010, 2013). In 2008, the Macedonian As-
sembly has an established Standing Inquiry Committee for Protection of Civil 
Freedoms and Rights, in reference to Article 26 of the Constitution and the 
Decision for establishing working bodies in the Macedonian Assembly from 
26 June 2008. The Assembly has, however, no specialized anti-corruption 
commission (Constitution of RM, 1992, Article 76.159).
3.3 The principle of impartiality in public administration
A professional, competent and impartial public administration has been iden-
tified as one of the key factors behind effective anti-corruption strategies and 
law enforcement. The employees of the public sector are obliged to perform 
their activities conscientiously, professionally and efficiently in an orderly and 
timely manner by law and Constitution. Civil and public servants are obliged 
to perform their jobs impartially, without being influenced by political parties, 
their own political beliefs or personal financial interests, and are obliged to 
protect the reputation of the public sector (Code of Ethics of Public Servants, 
2011, Article 139). Public sector employees may not participate in election 
campaigns or in other public events of a similar nature during office hours.
The principle of legality and the principle of equality is also regulated under 
the Law on Preventing Corruption. (1) Every citizen has the right to an equal 
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approach in the performance of the matters of public interest and to equal 
treatment on the part of persons carrying out public functions, without being 
the victim of corruption. (2) Every citizen has the right to a free appearance on 
the market and to free competition, without fearing that he may be the victim 
of monopolistic or discriminatory behavior, which is the result of corruption 
(Law on Prevention of Corruption, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2015). These 
principles have shown to be crucial for an effective fight against corruption.
In order to create independent, professional and impartial public administra-
tion, politically unbiased and based on the principle of competence and merit 
in recruitment, the Constitution and the legal framework have stipulated cri-
teria for recruitment and promotion in public administration, which should 
provide for its professionalism and expertise. Hence, the competences of the 
public administration are regulated under the Constitution and the relevant 
legislation stipulate the enforcing law, monitoring the situation in the area 
they are established for, giving initiatives, drafting regulations, settling with 
administrative affairs, and performing administrative oversight. Macedonia 
has developed a legal and institutional framework to guarantee the civil and 
political rights of citizens and provides for fundamental democratic processes 
(Law on Public Sector Employees, 2014, 2016). Nevertheless, most of the citi-
zen’s complains as reported by the Ombudsman annual reports in the period 
from 2001 to 2016 are related to biases in the labour relations and discrimi-
nation on political ground, followed by complaints from the discrimination in 
the judiciary and the exercise of their legal rights in the front of courts.
4 Discussion
4.1	 Discussion	on	the	Ombudsman	reports’	findings
The document analysis and the Ombudsman reports for the period from 2001 
to 2016, has identified several patterns of deviances in exercising power by 
administrative bodies. Citizens’ complaints to the Ombudsman during 2001 
to 2004/5 are related to the labour relations, a particular problem with la-
bour relation stopped on the grounds of technological surplus (Ombudsman 
Annual Report, 2002, p. 4). This period in the process of privatization set a 
framework of building a new path for edification of the inter-institutional sys-
tem and integrity system that would be able to address the citizens complains 
as experienced in practice. However, as evident in the Ombudsman report in 
2002, the taken initiatives to address the citizens complains did not deliver 
the required outcomes. Namely, the Agency of the Republic of Macedonia 
for Privatization confirmed the allegations for unlawfulness in the procedure 
of transformation of the public property. The Ombudsman sent a complaint 
to the Public Attorney for annulling the procedure for privatization. Yet, the 
recommendation, for unclear reasons and without any arguments was not 
accepted (Ombudsman Annual Report, 2002, pp. 4-12). This type of lack of 
institutional cooperation and lack of actions of the state bodies to the Om-
budsman requests is evident in the following period.
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The information on the employment discrimination on the political ground, 
has become even further evident in the Ombudsman report in the period 
from 2003 to 2016. In 2003, the Ombudsman reported on “drastic increase in 
the number of complaints in the field of labour which shows that the practice 
of so-called “party retaliation” continues after the conduct of any elections. 
This was particularly pronounced in the field of education and child protec-
tion institutions, both in the selection of candidates for employment and in 
and in the transformation of employees’ employment from indefinite to in-
definite contracts.
In 2005, the Ombudsman continued with the practice of taking actions against 
corrupt practices. As reported, the Ombudsman took respectively disclosure 
of three judges for unprofessional and unethical working. The Ombudsman 
reaction has recognized as “the brightest event” in the fight against corrup-
tion in 2005 in the cooperation corruption barometer, in which were included 
19 Chief in Editors of national media (Annual Report, 2005, p. 33). “The fre-
quent illegal and tolerant passive attitude by the local authorized bodies and 
officials caused by personal interests or political influences” continued to be 
reported as practice in the upcoming years. In, 2007 the Ombudsman report-
ed, “This situation creates justified revolt and dissatisfaction of citizens and 
their disbelief in the institutions, most of all in the higher officials in charge” 
(Ombudsman report, 2007, p. 38). During the course of procedures for ap-
pointing, in which the process was conducted according to the Law on work-
ing relations, the problems mainly referred to appointing an employee to a 
position, which was not in accordance with his/her professional background. 
(Ibid.) Once again, “typical cases referring to a violation of the right to work-
ing relations in conducting employment procedures at the state administra-
tion bodies, the unjustified reassigning, termination of the working relation, 
expressing dissatisfaction for calculated lower unemployment benefit, un-
realized right to annual leave etc.” were also reported in the Ombudsman 
Annual report (2009, p. 41). The citizens continued to complain “on violation 
of the equality right during employment procedures at the municipal admin-
istration, as well as violation of rights to working relation, according to them 
on political grounds (2010, p. 85). Moreover, the Ombudsman reported that 
additionally “another worrying fact is spread in other areas where it is de-
cided on citizens’ rights and selective approach is evident as well as unequal 
treatment in approaching justice.” (Ombudsman report, 2010, p. 90). On this 
ground, the Ombudsman suggested the employment of state servants to be 
liberated from any influences on a political basis as it directly concerns the 
quality, professionalism and responsibility in the execution of their work and 
certainly in the realization of citizens’ rights (Ombudsman report, 2011, p. 35).
During this period of time, the international OSCE/ODIHR monitoring mis-
sions prior or during elections have also reported on common allegations con-
cerning threats to the public sector workers for losing their jobs, threats that 
pensions or social benefits would be withdrawn if their recipients choose not 
to support the party in control at the local or national level etc. (OSCE/ODIHR 
reports, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2014, 2017). All of these threats served as 
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evidence of politicization of the civil service. Moreover, in 2010, the Govern-
ment made a decision to change the status of 5,000 full-time employees, lack-
ing transparency and objectivity of the decision, despite the EU criticism and 
expert opinion that such a procedure violates all principles of transparency, 
fairness and merit (CUP Report, 2017, pp. 8-9). Withal, the OSCE survey data 
has also revealed that citizens believe that there is the highest level of corrup-
tion (62.8%) in the recruitment and career advancement in public administra-
tion (OSCE, 2012, p. 147).
During this period, the Ombudsman has continued to call for active participa-
tion of the Assembly in holding executives accountable, to pushing for control 
over these occurrences, while alarming about the partisanship of the institu-
tions (Ombudsman reports, 2004, pp. 3-10; 2017). If such practices took place, 
this would have been considered as taking a new path towards a political cul-
ture of accountability or breaking patterns of the vicious cycle of misdoings.
In 2013, the Ombudsman has also raised the concerns that the conclusions of 
the Assembly, which should have obliged the Government and other bodies 
and organizations with public authority, to comply with the requests. Rath-
er, it has reported that the decisions and Ombudsman’s interventions have 
remained only declarative and rare, lacking compliance and respect to the 
normative conditions by the relevant bodies (Ombudsman report, 2013, p. 
22). On this occasion, the Ombudsman has reported on the non-cooperative 
attitudes by the Public Prosecutor’s Offices, the Basic Public Prosecutor’s Of-
fice for Organized Crime and Corruption (Ombudsman report, 2013, p. 66), 
the Administrative Court (Ombudsman report, 2014, p. 65) and other institu-
tions. The largest number of complaints received on the Ministry of interior 
occurred in 2015, the same year when the corruptive scandal, on the wire-tap-
ping materials, was revealed in the public. That said, 2015 was also another 
event of a critical juncture when the Urgent Priority Reforms were issued. In 
the next section, we will examine the process of actual justification through 
the national parliament.
4.2	 Legitimation	or	the	process	of	actual	justification	through	
the national parliament
In the period from 2001 to 2008, the data analyses on the available Minutes 
of Meetings/ Stenographic Notes and the annual parliamentary reports have 
identified few patterns in the process of actual justification. First, there has 
been some awareness among the parliamentarians on the need of institu-
tional cooperation between the Ombudsman and the other state bodies on 
the findings, including the data on the politicization or discrimination in the 
employment-based on political grounds. There is also awareness of more ef-
fective engagement of the parliament in exercising its normative power to 
demand from the state bodies to respect the requirements by the Ombuds-
man. In this period, the Ombudsman Annual Reports are discussed by the 
Commission for Political System and occasionally, the Commission has been 
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inviting representatives from ZELS, local communities, academics and experts 
in their respective fields (Assembly annual report, 2002 - 2003, p. 64).
During the discussion of the Ombudsman annual report from 2003, few par-
liamentarians raised the issue on the biases of the impartiality by the pub-
lic authorities and public servants. It was also suggested, “there is a need of 
much broader elaboration of the necessary activities and behaviours that 
public officials should have, in line with their duties to respect and exercise 
human rights and freedoms in the Republic of Macedonia, rather than to for-
mally adopt the report” (Stenographic notes, 2004, p. 71). However, it was de-
cided that “given our time is limited, and since this is a comprehensive report 
that touches on virtually all spheres, all areas of social life, we should make an 
effort to skip these topics.” (Ibid.). Moreover, it was stated that the fact that 
75% of complaints are disregarded and the fact that none of the summoned 
officials has responded to the Ombudsman’s indications, diminishes the con-
fidence in this important institution” was concluded during the sessions (Min-
utes of the meeting, 2004, p. 49). Yet, there is no record on the follow-up of 
these recommended measures or conclusions.
That said, due to the repetition of these similar patterns of scrutiny, the anal-
ysis has found that the discussions on the Ombudsman reports lacked consis-
tency and quality in the performance of actual justification. During the pre-
sentation of the Ombudsman Annual report in 2004, at the 97 Parliamentary 
Session, held on May 31, 2005, the Ombudsman has called on the need of 
increased action by the MPs, by evaluating how laws are applied, rather than 
to perform a technical exercise of a formal adoption of the reports. During 
the regular plenary sessions, the Ombudsman has addressed the problems 
concerning the citizens’ complaints on employment based on party affiliation. 
These practices of facades of legitimation continued in the following period, 
and yet the regulations under the Rules of Procedures that would improve 
the time-frameworks, or the rules that can introduce quality to the debate, 
did not change. Some of the MPs have recognized the negative long-term 
impact of such practices, as on the forthcoming youth “brain-drain” (51 reg-
ular Plenary Session, 10 April 2009). Yet, these discussions were followed by 
another formal adoption of the annual report.
The lack of normative compliance of the state bodies to the Ombudsman com-
plains and initiatives to the Agency for public administration reacted upon, 
remained constant. Nevertheless, the formality of the public discussions has 
continued in the following years, with limited use of the oversight means. 
Although the Standing Inquiry Committee for Protection of Civil Freedoms 
and Rights was established in 2008 with a duty to exercise quality discussion 
on the Ombudsman findings and support the capacities of exercising over-
sight in the protection of human rights and freedom, in the following period 
from 2014 and 2015, remained completely silent. During the period from 10 
May until 31 December 2014, 1 January to 5 March 2014 and from January 1 
2015, to December 31, 2015 the Standing Inquiry Committee for Protection 
of Civil Freedoms and Rights did not hold any sessions (Annual Report, 2014, 
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p. 87; 2015, 2016). Much of the institutional theory critique on the social trap 
is evident in the Ombudsman reports for the period of 2013-2016 as well, be-
fore and after the peak of the political crisis in 2015. That said, the indicators 
of corruptive practices in form of the politicization of public administration 
and the unequal access to justice, i.e. biases of the principle of impartiality, 
have continued to be raised in the Ombudsman annual reports (Ombudsman 
annual report, 2014, p. 72). During this period, the analysis of the EU Prog-
ress reports on the democratization progress of the country, show that the 
European Commission has been identifying the lack of significant efforts in 
ensuring transparency, professionalism and independence of the public ad-
ministration, in particular respect for the principle of merit-based employ-
ment that are not subject to political influence, together with the principle of 
equitable representation (EU Progress Reports, 2003-2014). However, there 
is also a lack of sufficient acknowledgement of the normative and legal need 
of compliance among the Ombudsman, the National Assembly and the other 
regulatory and independent bodies, concerning the strengthening of the rule 
of law and the implementation of anti-corruption strategies.
On 9 February 2015, a wire-tapping scandal was revealed, and the main oppo-
sition party accused the government of having been involved in widespread 
illegal surveillance of the private communications of political actors and state 
officials (European Commission, 2015, pp. 6–7). With the introduction of the 
Urgent priority reforms, based on the rule of law experts’ fact-finding mission 
in the country in 2015 and 2017, the i.e. Priebe report, the EU has called the 
institutions for ensuring legal sanctioning of non-compliance with the require-
ments and recommendations of independent bodies and has called on coop-
eration between the public authorities and the Ombudsman, acknowledging 
the role both of the Ombudsman, the parliament and the other regulatory 
bodies in addressing the rule of law shortcomings and the fight against cor-
ruption, as a necessary conditions for the process of democratic consolidation.
The initiative of the European Commission, with i.e. Priebe reports to stress 
the normative position of the Ombudsman and the need for in-depth coop-
eration with the Parliament, the judiciary and other state bodies, also intro-
duced the possibility for acknowledging the need of legitimation as a process 
of actual justification in delivering an actual act of account-giving. A break of 
patterns in this regard, would amount for breaking a situations of mutual mis-
trust, introduction of standards for higher moral costs and development of 
political culture of accountability. However, the formal character of the public 
debates of the Ombudsman reports revealing data on biases on laws, corrup-
tive practices, ineffective rule of law and discrimination in the employment on 
political ground have continued upon the period of issuing the Urgent Priority 
Reforms, with some changes in the level of Governmental engagement in the 
follow-up recommendations to the responsible institutions. Yet, the use of 
the normative oversight means for challenging the social traps or systemic 
corruption, remains under-acknowledged, both on national and EU level.
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5 Conclusion
This article has demonstrated that the independent role of the Ombudsman 
as a key guardian of the human rights has a crucial role in understanding the 
citizens’ concerns and the lack of trust in the political system, seen as a nec-
essary condition for effective law enforcement of anti-corruption strategies. 
The Parliament, on the other hand, serves as the guardian of representative 
democracy, but also as the impetus of the quality of democracy when legit-
imacy is drawn from its citizens if the principles of equality and legality are 
respected. This paper found that the consolidation of democracy requires an 
actual process of parliamentary oversight and control of the work of the ad-
ministrative bodies through the process of democratic legitimation and ac-
count giving.
That said, when the relation between actors is compromised as a result of 
unjustified or hidden actions that benefits ‘the few’ rather than ‘the many’, 
for unduly influence on the rules of the game, the trust between actors is bro-
ken and actors end up in situations of social traps (Kaufmann, 2008; Rothstein, 
2011; Kurer, 2005, p. 231). In this type of situation of mistrust there is loss of 
beliefs that the “others” will follow the rules of the game, or that rules and 
procedures are equally applicable to all. (i.e. equal access to justice). That said, 
the problems of social trust are seen in the citizens’ mistrust in democratic 
and administrative institutions. Hence, the complaints on discrimination in 
employment based on political grounds further disengage the citizens from 
the society or they start to accept the corrupt political system as part of the 
game. In this regard, this article recognize the ‘silent treatment’ of the citi-
zens’ complains as reported to the Ombudsman, as an act of everyday resis-
tance to ineffective governance of state institutions as well as a trigger for 
compliance with the “corrupt system” (Ledeneva, 2011, pp. 318-320).
This article identified that the Ombudsman hold normative power to report 
on deviances and malpractices as discrimination in employment, access to jus-
tice etc. However, as an independent body cannot stand alone, if a system 
of institutional cooperation and the political accountability is not well estab-
lished. Hence, although the Ombudsman has potential to actively engage in 
rooting out corruption, it is up to the Parliament as democratic institution 
to exercise actual legitimation, increase the quality of scrutiny and oversight, 
and start establishing culture of democratic accountability. Constraining the 
power of executives and reducing the opportunities for corruption requires 
collective actions, and no single body, such as the State Commission for pre-
vention of Corruption or the State Audit as well, can stand alone in the pro-
cess. That said, the actual exercise of democratic accountability is a necessary 
condition for pursuing effective process of democratization and actual exer-
cise of horizontal accountability in democratic political systems.
However, this article has shown that in the case of Macedonia, the exercise 
of the normative means of account giving or acknowledgment of the citizens 
complains of the system, had gradually eroded in the period from 2001 to 
2016. Moreover, up to 2017 and 2018, the Assembly had taken none or limit-
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ed follow-up measurements or actions to create public pressure to the state 
bodies which refused to cooperate with the Ombudsman, or call the Govern-
ment on accountability based on the findings as reported by the Ombuds-
man. This lack of actual exercise of democratic accountability created facades 
of legitimation, under which the vicious cycle of corruption continued to de-
velop into sophisticated forms such as state capture, and engage the citizens 
in the corrupt system and social mistrust.
Based on the presented discussion, this article has tested the theoretical ob-
servations from the democratic and institutional theory perspectives, and find 
that the quality of democracy and the process of democratization is affected 
by the absence of exercise of horizontal accountability, as regulated under 
the specifics of the political system. As a necessary condition for taking con-
trol over corrupt practices in the Governmental administration, the oversight 
means can contribute to the increase of transparency and flow of information 
between actors, institutions and individuals, and create conditions for actual 
account giving as well as to re-connect with the citizens. That said, reaching an 
impartial and professional public administration is a demanding and complex 
process that can start with breaking patterns of situations of social trust. As 
evident from the findings, in the case of Macedonia, there is a lack of parlia-
mentary scrutiny over Ombudsman report(s) and second, there is insufficient 
understanding of its impact on the prevention of corruption, in forms of re-
duced impartiality, administrative malpractices or politicization of administra-
tion. That said, Parliament and Ombudsman are failing to bridge their compe-
tences and mandates in inter-institutional cooperation that can contribute to 
the prevention of corruption, nepotism, clientelism or state capture. These ar-
guments can confirm that account giving affects the ineffective law enforce-
ment in anti-corruption strategies. In fragile democracies, the risks to quick 
transitions to situation of social traps, and high corruptive practices, are still 
ongoing, and the indicators of the respect of the civil rights should be taken 
very seriously. As long as the respect of the civil rights is in decline, rather than 
in progress, as evident in the case of Macedonia or other countries in the CEE, 
no progress in the fight against corruption is likely to be expected.
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